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The mail fraud statue, once described as the federal prosecutor’s 
“Colt 45 [or] Louisville Slugger”1 is one of the federal government’s 
major weapons in the fight against political corruption.2 The statute 
proscribes using the mails to carry out “any scheme or artifice to 
defraud.”3 When first enacted, the mail fraud statute was limited to 
traditional frauds involving money or property.4 At the turn of the 
twentieth century, however, the United States Supreme Court 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 
771 (1980). 
2 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud Meets Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1998); Joshua A. Kobrin, Note, Betraying Honest Services: Theories of 
Trust and Betrayal Applied to the Mail Fraud Statute and §§ 1346, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 779, 792 (2006); Carrie A. Tendler, Note, An Indictment of Bright 
Line Tests for Honest Services Mail Fraud, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729, 2729 (2004). 
3 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). 
4 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987). 
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concluded that certain fraud statutes were not limited to the loss of 
money or property. In Hammerschmidt v. United States, the Court 
concluded that the government was defrauded when someone 
interferes with its “lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or 
trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.”5 Hammerschmidt and 
its progeny led to the creation of the “intangible rights theory” through 
which the mail fraud statute was used to reach non-pecuniary frauds.6 
In the mid twentieth century prosecutors developed the “honest 
services” theory.7 Under this theory, public officials owe fiduciary 
duties to the citizenry.8 One of their fiduciary duties is to provide the 
public their “honest services.”9 In the battle against public corruption, 
prosecutors charged public officials with mail fraud when they utilized 
the mails in connection with breaching their fiduciary duties.10 Typical 
breaches of fiduciary duty involved the acceptance of bribes or the 
participation in kickback schemes.11 Until the 1970s, the honest 
services theory was used in connection with pecuniary frauds.12 But 
after Watergate, when federal prosecutors were specifically charged 
with fighting public corruption at the state and local levels, innovative 
prosecutors combined the intangible rights theory with the honest 
services theory and created the honest services fraud doctrine.13 Under 
this doctrine public officials could be indicted for mail fraud when 
                                                 
5 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924). 
6 Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790 n.50 (2006). 
7 See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941); Kobrin, supra 
note 2, at 791. 
8 McNally, 483 U.S. at 355. 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974); Shushan, 
117 F.2d at 115 (“[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a public official”). 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); Isaacs, 
493 F.2d 1124. 
11 See United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1998). 
12 Kobrin, supra note 2, at 791. 
13 Moohr, supra note 2, at 2-8; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790-94; Tendler, supra 
note 2, at 2730-34. 
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they breached their fiduciary duties regardless of whether or not the 
public suffered a tangible loss.14 Although the honest services fraud 
doctrine began in the public sector it was later extended to the private 
sector.15  
Over the next two decades each Circuit accepted the honest 
services fraud doctrine.16 But in 1987, the Supreme Court struck the 
doctrine down in McNally v. United States, holding that the mail fraud 
statute was limited to frauds involving money or property.17 One year 
later, Congress resurrected the honest services fraud doctrine through 
the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346.18 Section 1346 states that “[f]or 
the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ 
includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right 
of honest services.”19 Congress, however, failed to define the terms 
“intangible rights” and “honest services.” As a result the statute is 
frequently challenged on vagueness and federalism grounds.20 To 
counter these concerns, the lower courts have adopted various limiting 
principles to help limit prosecutorial overreach and to prevent minor 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347; Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124. 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981). Two articles 
discussing honest services fraud in the private sector include John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 427 (1998) and Tendler, supra note 2. Honest services fraud in the 
private sector is beyond the scope of this Note. 
16 United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Sara Sun 
Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government’s Authority to Prosecute 
Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions 
and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 699, 711 (2000); Kobrin, supra note 2, at 794. 
17 483 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1987). 
18 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508 (1988) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346). 
19 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v. Bryan, 58 
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Waymer 55 F.3d 564 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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breaches of fiduciary duties from becoming federal crimes. 21 In 
United States v. Bloom the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit established its limiting principle as the “misuse of 
office . . . for private gain.”22 The Seventh Circuit is the only Circuit 
that has adopted this standard.23 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit refined its Bloom standard in United 
States v. Thompson.24 In Thompson, Georgia Thompson, a state civil 
servant steered a contract to a business whose owner gave political 
donations to the Wisconsin Governor’s reelection campaign, both prior 
to and after the award of the contract.25 The political contributions, 
however, were fully disclosed and there was no evidence that 
Thompson or anyone else accepted a bribe or was involved in a 
kickback scheme.26 Although the Seventh Circuit has long held that 
“[n]ot every breach of every fiduciary duty works a criminal fraud,”27 
in Thompson the government’s theory was that “any politically 
motivated departure from state administrative rules is a federal crime, 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1104-07 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(requiring that the government prove an intent to defraud); United States v. 
Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692-93 (3d Cir. 2002) (adopting a state law limiting 
principle); United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998) (adopting the 
misuse of office for private gain limiting principle); United States v. Brumley, 116 
F.3d 728, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (requiring that the government prove that 
services owed under state law were not delivered); United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 
713, 732 (1st Cir. 1996) (requiring that the government prove “a demonstrated intent 
to deceive”). 
22 Bloom, 149 F.3d at 655. 
23 United States v. Malone, No. 02:03-CR-00500-LRH-LRL, 2006 WL 
2583293, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2006); Albert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud & 
RICO Racket: Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 113, 115 
(2006). 
24 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007). 
25 Id. at 878-79. 
26 Id. at 879, 881. Thompson was also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 666 
entitled “Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds,” but she was 
not charged with bribery. Id. at 880-81. Rather the government’s theory was that she 
“misapplied” federal funds. Id. 
27 Bloom, 149 F.3d at 645 (citing United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 
(7th Cir. 1973). 
4
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when the mails . . . are involved.”28 The government further argued 
that Thompson “deprived Wisconsin of her ‘honest services’ [when 
she failed] to implement state law the way the administrative code laid 
it down.”29 
In deciding Thompson the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
government’s theory that all politically motivated violations of 
administrative rules are federal crimes.30 The court stated “[t]he idea 
that it is a federal crime for any official in state or local government to 
take account of political considerations when deciding how to spend 
public money is preposterous.”31 The Seventh Circuit concluded that 
Ms. Thompson was innocent, reversed her conviction, and ordered her 
immediate release from prison—even prior to issuing its formal 
opinion.32 
Although the Thompson facts were exceptional,33 from a legal 
perspective the case appears to be rather ordinary. In deciding the case, 
the Seventh Circuit applied and followed the limiting principle it 
announced in Bloom.34 The court found that Thompson neither 
                                                 
28 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 878. 
29 Id. at 882. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 883. 
32 Id. at 878. 
33 Wisconsin Governor, and former state attorney general, Jim Doyle was 
quoted as saying “the three judges did an ‘extraordinary thing’ by entering an order 
finding Thompson innocent and ordering her immediate release.” Steven Walters & 
John Diedrich, Federal Appeals Court Tosses Thompson Case: Ex-state official 
freed: Judge calls evidence she steered travel contract ‘beyond thin’, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2007, at A1. Some commentators have argued that the case was 
prosecuted, in a heated election year, solely for political reasons in an effort to help 
defeat Governor Doyle’s re-election bid. Adam Cohen, Editorial, A Woman Wrongly 
Convicted and a U.S. Attorney Who Kept His Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at 
A18; Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Conviction may cost Thompson $300,000: 
Former state employee in seclusion after release, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 
2007, at A1; Stephanie Francis Ward, When Honesty Is Not Best Politics: Courts 
struggle with honest-services charges in bribery cases, ABA J., Aug. 2007, at 18, 20. 
34 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 883-84. 
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misused her office, nor had a private gain.35 In doing so, the Seventh 
Circuit further clarified the Bloom standard holding “that neither an 
increase in salary for doing what one’s superiors deem a good job, nor 
an addition to one’s peace of mind, is a ‘private benefit’ for the 
purpose of § 1346.”36  
But a more nuanced reading of the opinion suggests that, in 
refining the Bloom standard, the court may have inadvertently opened 
the door to future abuses of the public trust by civil servants. Prior to 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Thompson, the Northern District of 
Illinois held, on three prior occasions, that one’s job or the prospect of 
future employment may serve as a private gain under the Bloom 
standard.37 The first case in which this reasoning appeared was United 
States v. Bauer,38 later followed by United v States Munson,39 and 
United States v. Sorich.40 The government cited to Sorich and Munson 
in support of its position in Thompson.41 The Seventh Circuit found 
these cases “unpersuasive.”42 But the court did not explain its 
reasoning.43 
Munson is not readily distinguishable from Thompson, leading to 
the conclusion that Thompson simply overrules Sorich, Munson, and 
Bauer. Cutting against this conclusion is the court’s language finding 
the cases “unpersuasive” rather than simply stating that the cases are 
overruled.44 Therefore, it is arguable, and more likely, that the court 
was distinguishing Thompson from Sorich, Munson, and Bauer. Sorich 
                                                 
35 Id. at 884. 
36 Id. at 884. 
37 United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Ill. 2006); United States 
v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 
2004); United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 14, 2000). 
38 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *10-12. 
39 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274, at *3. 
40 Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 828-30. 
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and Bauer can be readily distinguished from Thompson on the grounds 
that Sorich and Bauer held politically appointed policy-making jobs 
whose job security depended on the continued election of their 
political patrons.45 In contrast, Thompson held a civil servant position 
with independent job security,46 and was hired by the previous 
administration of the opposing political party.47 Thus, one reading of 
Thompson is that a political appointee’s job may serve as a private 
gain, but a state civil servant’s job may not. This outcome has the 
potential to create an environment where civil servants can make—in 
perhaps subtle or Machiavellian ways—political decisions to help 
further the careers or reward the friends of their current political 
supervisors. In turn, the civil servants can be rewarded as a part of 
their normal compensation without the threat of punishment.48 This 
outcome potentially continues the graft, or minimally the perception of 
corruption, that increases the public’s mistrust of government and 
decreases its faith in the political process. Furthermore, this outcome 
will undercut the main purpose behind the enactment of § 1346—to 
help fight public corruption at the state and local levels.  
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit could have avoided the 
problems raised by Thompson if it had first decided as a threshold 
matter whether or not a “scheme” existed. Although not defined in the 
mail fraud statute, one of the dictionary definitions of scheme is “[a]n 
artful plot or plan, [usually] to deceive others.”49 When used in a fraud 
                                                 
45 Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30; United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2000). 
46 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 882. 
47 Walters & Diedrich, supra note 33. 
48 See Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884 (“[i]t would stretch the ordinary 
understanding of language . . . to call a public employee’s regular compensation, 
approved through above-board channels, a kind of ‘private gain’” (emphasis 
added)). 
49 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (8th ed. 2004); see also WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2029 (1964) (defining scheme as “a crafty or 
unethical project”). Artifice has a similar definition. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
120 (8th ed. 2004) defining artifice as “[a] clever plan or idea, esp. one intended to 
deceive.” 
7
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statute it becomes clear that this is the intended meaning of scheme, as 
opposed to it meaning “a plan or program of something to be done.”50 
Simply put, a “scheme” as defined in the mail fraud statute requires 
some nefarious ends.51 An analysis of Thompson will show that there 
was no “scheme.” In contrast, an analysis of Sorich, Munson, and 
Bauer will show that a “scheme” did exist. In the grand scheme52 of 
honest services mail fraud analyses, making the determination of 
whether or not a “scheme” exists may be of limited use because most 
cases result from bribery or kickback schemes.53 But, Thompson was 
prosecuted for honest services fraud in a case where there were no 
allegations that she or anyone else had taken a bribe or participated in 
a kickback scheme.54 Therefore, it is worth reminding the court to take 
a step back and view the whole picture before delving into detailed 
legal tests. 
 Section I of this Note will briefly chronicle the history of the mail 
fraud statute, detail the rise of the honest services fraud doctrine, and 
review the reasons behind the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
doctrine in McNally and Congress’s restoration of the doctrine through 
the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Section II will discuss the Seventh 
Circuit’s treatment of honest services fraud post-McNally, and lay out 
the Seventh Circuit’s reasons for adopting the misuse of office for 
private gain limiting principle in Bloom. The Third Circuit has 
criticized and rejected the Seventh Circuit’s Bloom standard, and 
instead has adopted a state law limiting principle. Section II will also 
examine the reasoning behind the Third Circuit’s position.  
Section III will compare the Seventh and Third Circuits’ standards 
to determine if either standard is practically or theoretically superior, 
and if the concerns raised by Thompson can be solved by adopting the 
                                                 
50 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2029 (1964). 
51 See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 729 (1st Cir. 1996) (the 
intent of the scheme must be the deprivation of honest services). 
52 Using scheme under its definition of “a combination of elements . . . that are 
connected, adjusted, and integrated by design.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2029 (1964). 
53 See supra note 11. 
54 See supra note 26. 
8
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Third Circuit’s standard. Section III will conclude that the concerns 
raised in Thompson could have been adverted by adopting the Third 
Circuit’s standard. But adopting the Third Circuit’s standard would 
raise a different set of problems. Therefore, that is not a long-term 
solution to the overall questions raised by § 1346. Furthermore it is 
likely that both standards lead to the same outcomes under the same 
set of facts. Therefore, Section III cannot conclude that either test is 
practically or theoretically superior. 
Because the Seventh Circuit would gain little benefit from 
adopting the Third Circuit’s standard, Section IV examines the private 
gain aspect of the Bloom standard. Section IV first details the 
conclusions reached by courts in the Northern District of Illinois in the 
Sorich, Munson, and Bauer cases—that one’s job or the prospect of 
future employment can serve as a private gain under Bloom. Next, 
Section IV analyzes how Thompson’s opposite conclusion can lead to 
the “subtle schemes” problem based on the political appointee/civil 
servant dichotomy that distinguishes Thompson from Sorich and 
Bauer. 
Section V describes how the Seventh Circuit could have 
prevented the “subtle scheme” problem if it had determined as a 
threshold matter whether or not a “scheme” existed. Had the court 
made this threshold determination it could have reached the same 
result in Thompson without having to discuss the private gain issue 
because Section V will show that there was no “scheme” in Thompson, 
while a “scheme” did exist in Sorich, Munson, and Bauer. Making the 
threshold determination, however, may be difficult in cases, such as 
Thompson and Bauer, where only one civil servant is acting. Section V 
deals with the problem by proposing the adoption of a business 
judgment rule to assist in determining whether or not a scheme exists.
9
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A. Early History 
 
The current mail fraud statute traces its origins to the 1872 
reorganization and recodification of the then existing postal laws.55 In 
the years after the Civil War, along with the growth of the national 
economy, the country experienced an increase in the number of large-
scale financial frauds.56 Prior to the Civil War, despite Congress’s 
power to establish the post office,57 the prevailing view was that it 
lacked the power to regulate any material, including objectionable 
material, placed in the mails.58 After the Civil War, the northern view 
of federal power—that Congress had the power to prevent the mails 
from being used for illegal purposes—prevailed, although certain 
tactics were prohibited.59 
Despite this new view of federal power, the language of the 
original mail fraud statute suggests that Congress was still concerned 
that the law might be stuck down as unconstitutional.60 In an effort to 
prevent this outcome, Congress relied heavily on its power to prevent 
the misuse of the mails, perhaps explaining much of the superfluous 
“mail-emphasizing” language.61 Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
55 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987). For a detailed history 
of the mail fraud statute see Rakoff, supra note 1. 
56 See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878); Rakoff, supra note 1, at 780.  
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
58 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 781. 
59 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 781. Tactics that were prohibited included the 
opening of sealed letters. Id. 
60 Id. at 785-86. 
61 See id. The original mail fraud statute stated: 
 
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, [to] be effected by either opening or 
intending to open correspondence or communication with any 
other person (whether resident within or outside the United States), 
10
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ruling in Ex parte Jackson62 put to rest the idea that the mail-
emphasizing language was needed.63 But because the language 
existed, it led to divergent statutory interpretations in the lower 
courts.64 Under the strict view, the mail emphasizing language allowed 
for the prosecution of only those frauds that were “dependent” on the 
                                                                                                                   
by means of the post-office establishment of the United States, or 
by inciting such other person to open communication with the 
person so devising or intending, shall, in and for executing such 
scheme or artifice (or attempting so to do), place any letter or 
packet in any post-office of the United States, or take or receive 
any therefrom, such person, so misusing the post-office 
establishment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be 
punished with a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, with or 
without such imprisonment, as the court shall direct, not exceeding 
eighteen calendar months. The indictment, information, or 
complaint may severally charge offenses to the number of three 
when committed within the same six calendar months; but the 
court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion 
the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the 
post-office establishment enters as an instrument into such 
fraudulent scheme and device. 
 
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (1872) (codified at 
U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5480 (1875) (emphasis added). See Rakoff, supra note 1, 
at 785-86 (explaining why the emphasized language is unnecessary, and 
speculating that Congress included it to ground the statute in its powers to 
prevent the misuse of the mails because of its fear that the statute would be 
struck down as unconstitutional). 
62 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
63 See id. (upholding the illegal lottery statute). The illegal lottery statute was 
incorporated in the same Act as the mail fraud statute, but was contained in a 
separate section. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 302 (1872) (codified at 
U.S. Rev. Stat. § 3894 (1875)). In upholding the power of Congress to prevent 
illegal lottery material from being sent through the mails, the Court stated “[t]he 
power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of 
the country. The right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the 
right to determine what shall be excluded.” Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S at 732. For a 
discussion of the effect of the Court’s decision in Ex parte Jackson on the 
interpretation of the mail fraud statute see Rakoff, supra note 1, at 787-90. 
64 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 789-90. 
11
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mails.65 But under the broad view the mail fraud statute could be used 
to punish any fraud so long as it was furthered by the “abuse” of the 
mails.66 
For nearly two decades, the lower courts were split between the 
strict and broad interpretations, and the Supreme Court did not take 
any cases to resolve the dispute.67 In 1889, Congress amended the mail 
fraud statue to include a list of specific schemes.68 If this was an 
attempt to resolve the issue of strict versus broad interpretation, it 
probably would have failed.69 We will never know because the lower 
courts did not get the opportunity to interpret the new language.70 
Instead, in 1896, the Supreme Court’s decision in Durland v. United 
States71 undercut the support for the strict view and set the stage for 
the broad interpretation of the mail fraud statute.72 
                                                 
65 Id. at 790. For a discussion of the strict view of the original mail fraud 
statute see id. at 790-95. 
66 Id. For a discussion of the broad view of the original mail fraud statute see 
id. at 795-801. 
67 Id. at 809. During this time two cases, In re Henry, 123 U.S. 372 (1887) and 
United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888), did come before the Supreme Court, but 
they were decided on technical matters, and not on the scope of the mail fraud 
statute. Id. at 808. 
68 Id. at 809 (citing Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393 § 1, 25 Stat. 873). 
69 Id. The courts that had broadly interpreted the statue likely would have 
continued to do so under the belief that this was what Congress intended when it 
continued to add to the list of frauds. Id. But, the new list of items could also confirm 
the strict constructionist view that only the listed frauds were intended to be covered. 
Id.  
70 Id. at 810. 
71 161 U.S. 306 (1896). 
72 See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 811 (“the broad and conclusory language used 
by Justice Brewer exemplifies reasoning typical of the broad constructionist 
decisions and gives not the slightest hint of support for the strict constructionists’ 
approach”); Moohr, supra note 2, at 7-8 (discussion expansive interpretations of the 
mail fraud statute). See also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) 
(“the phrase [scheme or artifice to defraud] is to be interpreted broadly insofar as 
property rights are concerned”). 
12
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In Durland, the first case to interpret the language73 “any scheme 
or artifice to defraud,” the defendant argued that the mail fraud statute 
was limited to the common law definition of “false pretenses”—that 
only past conduct, but not future conduct could be punished.74 The 
Court rejected this argument and held that the mail fraud statute 
reached to both past and present conduct, as well as to future 
promises.75 The Durland holding was later codified in the 1909 
amendment to the mail fraud statute.76 After Durland, the mail fraud 
statute remained virtually unchanged, except for a revision in 1948 to 
modernize the language, remove surplusage, and to recodify the 
statute at its present location—18 U.S.C. § 1341.77 
In the nearly hundred years since the 1909 amendment, the 
mailing element has been reduced to nothing more than a means of 
providing federal jurisdiction.78 Despite this development, some courts 
continue to misplace emphasis on the mailing element instead of 
focusing on the core issue: the definition of the term “scheme to 
defraud.”79 Perhaps courts have not defined “scheme to defraud” 
because they want to adhere to Congress’s intent—arguably its intent 
from the very beginning—to apply the mail fraud statute broadly.80 By 
defining a “scheme to defraud” the courts might leave something 
outside of the definition that Congress intended to include. Chief 
Justice Burger characterized the mail fraud statute as the “first line of 
                                                 
73 McNally, 483 U.S. at 356. 
74 Durland, 161 U.S. at 312. 
75 Id. at 313. 
76 McNally, 483 U.S. at 357. The 1909 amendment also eliminated the list of 
schemes added in 1889 and removed the second element, which required proof that 
the defendant intended to both defraud and misuse the mails. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 
816. 
77 Brian C. Behrens, Note, 18 U.S.C. section 1341 and section 1346: 
Deciphering the Confusing Letters of the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 489, 497 (1993). 
78 Moohr, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
79 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 822 (concluding that the focus on the mailing 
element is “misplaced and serves no useful function”). 
80 Id. 
13
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defense” against new types of fraud.81 He described the mail fraud 
statute as a “stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new 
[frauds], until particularized legislation can be developed and passed 
to deal directly with the evil.”82 Although not new, public corruption is 
a type of fraud that came under the ambit of the mail fraud statute 
beginning in the 1970s, under the honest services fraud doctrine.83 
 
B. Development of the Honest Services Fraud Doctrine 
 
The honest services fraud doctrine resulted from federal 
prosecutors’ novel combination of the “intangible rights” and “honest 
services” theories.84 The intangible rights theory was predicated upon 
the court’s removal of the pecuniary loss requirement for obtaining a 
fraud conviction.85 Traditionally, the words “to defraud” referred to the 
harming of one’s property rights.86 But in the early twentieth century, 
the Supreme Court removed the requirement of a pecuniary loss in a 
series of decisions interpreting various fraud statutes, but not in the 
mail fraud statute.87 For example, in Hammerschmidt v. United States, 
                                                 
81 United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
82 Id. at 405. 
83 Moohr, supra note 2, at 2; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 792-93; Tendler, supra 
note 2, at 2730. 
84 Moorh, supra note 2, at 8; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790-94; Tendler, supra 
note 2, at 2733-34. 
85 Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790. 
86 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (citing Hammerschmidt 
v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail 
Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 153, 163 (1994) [hereinafter Moohr, Someone to Watch Over Us].  
87 Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910) (construing the conspiracy to 
defraud statute as broad enough to reach “any conspiracy for the purpose of 
impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any department of 
government”). See also Kobrin supra note 2, at 790 n.50 citing to United States v. 
Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1915) (government does not have to prove that a 
defrauded victim of a defendant impersonating a federal employee or officer lost 
anything of value) and United States v. Plyler, 222 U.S. 15, 16 (1911) (government 
does not have to prove a financial loss to bring a case against a defendant who 
14
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the Supreme Court, interpreting the conspiracy to defraud statute, 
concluded that the government was not only defrauded when it was 
cheated out of money or property, but also when someone interferes 
with its “lawful governmental functions.”88 The Court further stated 
that “[i]t is not necessary that the Government shall be subjected to 
property or pecuniary loss by the fraud, but only that its legitimate 
official action and purpose shall be defeated by the misrepresentation, 
chicane or the overreaching of those charged with carrying out the 
governmental intention.”89 
The honest services theory traces its origins to the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Shushan v. United States.90 In Sushan, members of the 
Orleans Parish Levee Board, two bond dealers, and a public 
accountant engaged in a scheme to charge excessive fees in a bond 
refinancing deal.91 They were convicted of violating the mail fraud 
statute under the theory that their representations were false because of 
the excessive fees, and because the Levee Board was “deprived of 
[the] fair judgment of one of its members,” as a result of the bribes 
that were paid as part of the scheme.92 The court stated that a scheme 
                                                                                                                   
forged and presented papers certifying his character to the Civil Service 
Commission) that based their holdings on Haas. 
88 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924). 
89 Id. 
90 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941). See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 
1124, 1150 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973). “In 
Shushan there is the implication that a scheme to gain personal favors from public 
officials is a scheme to defraud the public, although the interest lost by the public 
can be described no more concretely than as an intangible right to the proper and 
honest administration of government.” States, 488 F.2d at 766. Shushan is often 
cited to as the basis for the intangible rights doctrine as well. Kobrin, supra note 2, at 
792-93. For the argument that courts misinterpreted Shushan as the basis for the 
intangible rights doctrine, and a prescient view of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
McNally that the mail fraud is limited to frauds that result in the gain of money or 
property, see W. Robert Gray, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-
Corruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 
562, 584-88 (1980). 
91 117 F.2d at 114. 
92 Id. at 113-15.  
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to defraud exists even in the absence of any misrepresentations if one 
betrays another or corrupts another’s advisor to gain money unfairly.93 
It further stated that a person who bribes a public official to obtain 
more favorable terms in a public contract not only commits the crime 
of bribery, but also engages in a “scheme to defraud the public.”94 
Finally, in what ultimately became the basis for the honest services 
theory, the court stated, “[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a 
public official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting [a 
public official] must in the federal law be considered a scheme to 
defraud.”95 
While Shushan may have planted the seeds for the honest services 
fraud doctrine, it was not until the 1970s, when federal prosecutors 
were specifically charged with fighting public corruption, that the 
doctrine took root and started to bear fruit.96 To battle public 
corruption, innovative prosecutors combined the “intangible rights” 
theory that fraud is not limited to the loss of money or property with 
the “honest services” theory that governmental officials owe fiduciary 
duties to the public.97 The combination of the two theories resulted in 
the birth of the honest services fraud doctrine under which the mere 
breach of a fiduciary duty could be punished under the mail fraud 
statute, regardless of whether or not the public has suffered a tangible 
harm.98 One of the first cases prosecuted under the honest services 
fraud doctrine, and perhaps a paradigm case of the doctrine, was 
United States v. Isaacs.99 




96 Moohr, supra note 2, at 8-11; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 792-93. 
97 Moohr, supra note 2, at 8-11; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 792-93. 
98 Moohr, supra note 2, at 8-11; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 792-93. Although 
Shushan is sometimes cited as the origin of the intangible rights theory, the 
intangible rights language in the case is likely dictum given that the court found that 
the Orleans Parish Levee Board suffered a tangible loss. Shushan, 117 F.2d at 119; 
see also Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790. 
99 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974). See Kobrin, supra note 2, at 793. 
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In 1973, Otto Kerner,100 former Illinois Governor, and Theodore 
Isaacs, Illinois Director of Revenue under Kerner, were convicted on a 
variety of charges, including honest services mail fraud, for accepting 
bribes in return for promoting certain horse racing interests.101 Kerner 
and Isaacs challenged their mail fraud convictions arguing that neither 
the State of Illinois nor its citizens were defrauded of money or 
property.102 In fact, as result of their actions, state revenue from horse 
racing doubled.103 Despite the increase in state revenue, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld their convictions. The court first quoted the language in 
Hammerschmidt that for fraud it is not necessary that the government 
suffer a pecuniary loss, but only that its legitimate actions are 
defeated.104 The court next quoted the “sacred duties” language in 
Shushan, and the language stating that a scheme to bribe a public 
official is also a scheme to defraud the public.105 Finally, the court 
concluded that Kerner deprived the State of Illinois and it citizens of 
his honest services.106 
After Isaacs and a few additional groundbreaking cases,107 the 
honest service fraud doctrine was frequently used in the fight against 
public corruption, and was later extended to private breaches of 
fiduciary duty, most notably in the corporate context.108 During this 
time, each of the Circuits adopted some form of the honest services 
                                                 
100 At the time of his conviction, Otto Kerner was a sitting United States 
Circuit Judge in the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1140. 
101 Id. at 1131. 
102 Id. at 1149. 
103 Id. at 1139. 
104 Id. at 1150. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973). 
108 Kobrin, supra note 2, at 794; Tendler, supra note 2, at 2733-35. 
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fraud doctrine. 109 But, the doctrine suffered a major blow in 1987 
when the Supreme Court decided McNally v. United States.110  
 
C. Rejection and Restoration of the Honest Services Fraud Doctrine 
 
McNally arose out of an insurance kickback scheme between a 
Kentucky state official and Charles McNally, the nominal owner of the 
insurance agency through which the payments were funneled.111 The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed both of their convictions for mail fraud under 
the honest services fraud doctrine, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine the doctrine’s validity.112 The Court rejected the 
honest services fraud doctrine, holding that the mail fraud statute was 
limited to frauds involving money or property.113 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first noted that the text of 
the statute clearly protects property rights, but does not mention the 
citizenry’s right to good government.114 Reviewing the history of the 
statute, the Court concluded that under Durland, the term “scheme or 
artifice to defraud” was to be given a broad reading only in the context 
of property rights; nothing “indicate[d] that the statute had a more 
extensive reach.”115 Next, the Court recognized that, in 1909, 
Congress codified Durland’s holding by “add[ing] the words ‘or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises’ after the original phrase ‘any scheme or 
artifice to defraud.’’’116 The question the Court faced was whether 
Congress intended to reach nontraditional frauds under the mail fraud 
statute when it used the word “or” between the original language and 
                                                 
109 See supra note 16. 
110 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
111 Id. at 352-53. 
112 Id. at 355-56. 
113 Id. at 359-60. 
114 Id. at 356. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 357. 
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the 1909 Amendment.117 The Court concluded it did not, and that 
Congress was instead following the common understanding that the 
mail fraud statute was limited to the protection of property rights.118 
The Court began its legal analysis by stating “[b]ecause the two 
phrases identifying the proscribed schemes appear in the disjunctive, it 
is arguable that they are to be construed independently and that the 
money-or-property requirement of the latter phrase does not limit 
schemes to defraud to those aimed at causing deprivation of money or 
property.”119 The Court explained that this was the reading given to the 
statute by the Courts of Appeals in approving the honest services fraud 
doctrine.120 The Court then concluded that when Congress amended 
the mail fraud statute in 1909 it was not departing from the common 
understanding that fraud was limited to harming one’s property 
rights.121 In reaching this conclusion the Court analyzed the language 
from Hammerschmidt stating that it was fraudulent to interfere with 
lawful government functions.122 The Court, however, concluded that 
the Hammerschmidt language was “based on a consideration not 
                                                 
117 Id. at 358. The mail fraud statute in effect at the time of McNally read in 
pertinent part: 
 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or 
artifice or attempting so to do, [uses the mails or causes them 
to be used], shall be fined not more than $ 1,000 or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both. 
 
Id. at 352 (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341). 
118 McNally, 483 U.S. at 358-59. 
119 Id. at 358. 
120 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(rejecting the appellant’s conjunctive reading of the statute and stating, “[t]he more 
natural construction of the wording in the statute is to view the two phrases 
independently.”) 
121 McNally, 483 U.S. at 358. 
122 Id. at 359 n.8. 
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applicable to the mail fraud statute.”123 Finally, the Court, noting 
federalism as well as vagueness concerns, invoked the rule of lenity to 
limit the mail fraud statute to “the protection of property rights.”124 
Before applying its holding to the to McNally facts, the Court stated 
that “[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly 
than it has.”125 
The following year Congress expressed its disapproval of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McNally by resurrecting the honest 
services fraud doctrine through an amendment to the mail fraud statute 
that it buried in one of the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 (“ADAA”).126 Although Congress had previously considered 
bills with more comprehensive language recognizing the citizenry’s 
right to good government,127 the amendment in the ADAA, codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1346, simply states “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the 
term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to 
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”128 
Noticeably lacking, however, is a definition of the terms “intangible 
rights” and “honest services.” Thus, while courts agree that § 1346 
was intended to legislatively override McNally, 129 its imprecise 
                                                 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 360. 
125 Id. 
126 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508 (1988) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346). See also Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as 
a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 
367, 488-91 (1989); Moohr, Someone To Watch Over Us, supra note 86, at 169. For 
the argument that the court did not “speak more clearly” see Judge Jolly’s dissenting 
opinion in United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 736-49 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
(Jolly, J., dissenting). 
127 Brumley, 116 F.3d at 742-45 (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
128 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508 (1988) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346). 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 134-36 (2d Cir. 2003) (en 
banc); United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 689-90 (3d Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 
363-64 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723-24 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
20
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language has led to new problems, while simultaneously leaving prior 
problems unresolved. 130 
Section 1346 has been frequently challenged on vagueness 
grounds, 131 and that it violates the principles of federalism because it 
involves the federal government in matters that are primarily a state 
concern.132 Because courts are concerned that the boundaries of § 
1346 remain unclear, they have adopted limiting principles to uphold 
the constitutionality of the statute and to counter the vagueness and 
federalism concerns.133 
 
II. POST-MCNALLY HONEST SERVICES FRAUD 
 
A. Seventh Circuit’s Decision in Bloom 
 
The Seventh Circuit adopted the limiting principle of “misuse of 
office . . . for private gain” in United States v. Bloom.134 In Bloom, 
Lawrence Bloom, a Chicago alderman and part-time private attorney, 
was accused of giving legal advice to a private client about how to 
retain its real property without paying a large portion of its past-due 
                                                 
130 Behrens, supra note 77, at 515; Kurland, supra note 126, at 490; Moohr, 
Someone To Watch Over Us, supra note 86, at 170. 
131 See United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 698-699 (7th Cir. 2007) (§ 1346 
is not unconstitutional as applied); Rybicki, 354 F.3d at137 n.10; Frost, 125 F.3d at 
371 (§ 1346 is not facially unconstitutional); United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 
568-569 (11th Cir. 1995) (§ 1346 is not unconstitutional as applied). A panel of the 
Second Circuit is the only court to have found § 1346 unconstitutionally vague as 
applied. United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 112 (2d Cir. 2002). The Handakas 
court would have also found § 1346 facially unconstitutional if it had been the first 
panel in the Second Circuit to address the issue. Id. at 104. Handakas, however, was 
overruled by the Second Circuit sitting en banc in Rybicki. 354 F.3d at 144 (although 
not deciding the vagueness issue on its merits, the en banc court held the Handakas 
panel should not have reached the constitutional question; therefore, its vagueness 
holding was overruled). 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, (5th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc); Beale, supra note 16; Moohr, Someone to Watch Over Us, supra note 86. 
133 See supra note 21. 
134 149 F.3d at 655 (1998). 
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property taxes.135 Bloom allegedly informed his client that, although 
illegal, it could avoid paying back taxes by sending a straw bidder to 
the tax scavenger sale to purchase the property, and then having the 
straw bidder re-convey the property back to the client after the 
expiration of the redemption period.136 As a result of giving this 
advice, Bloom was charged under § 1346 of depriving the City of 
Chicago of his honest services.137 
The honest services fraud charge was dismissed by the district 
court, and came before the Seventh Circuit on the government’s 
interlocutory appeal.138 In affirming the district court, the Seventh 
Circuit rejected the government’s position that “public employees may 
not do anything in their private lives that acts against the City’s 
interests.”139 The court believed that the government’s position would 
result in the creation of an “impermissible federal common-law 
crime,” and noted that it has long been held that “[n]ot every breach of 
every fiduciary duty works a criminal fraud.”140 Because not every 
breach of a fiduciary duty is a criminal fraud, the Seventh Circuit next 
faced the difficult task of determining where to draw the line between 
fiduciary duty breaches that work a criminal fraud and those that do 
not.141 
                                                 
135 Id. at 650-51. In Chicago, aldermanic positions are part-time. Id. at 650. 
136 Id. at 651. Under Illinois law a bidder at a tax scavenger sale takes the 
property free and clear of the tax lien at the expiration of the redemption period. Id. 
The original owner can redeem the property during the redemption period by paying 
all back taxes and interest. Id. Illinois law also allows the winning bidder to sell the 
property back to the original owner, despite its effect of wiping out the back taxes. 
Id. But it is illegal for the original owner or her agent to bid on the property during 
the scavenger sale, and bidders must certify that they are not associated with the 
original owner. Id. 
137 Id. Although the property taxes were owed to the county, the prosecutor’s 
theory was that the City of Chicago was deprived of Bloom’s honest services 
because the property tax money collected by the county flows through to the City. 
Id. at 650. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 654. 
140 Id. (citing United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
141 Id. 
22
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The court first looked to the language of the §§ 1341 and 1346, 
but found no help in the text of either statute. Next, the court 
considered the breach of a fiduciary duty and the violation of “some 
other rule of law” as a limiting principle.142 The court rejected this 
approach based on two shortcomings when applied to Bloom’s 
situation.143 First, Bloom did not violate the tax scavenger sale law, his 
client and the straw purchaser did; and second, the client’s violation of 
the law had nothing to do with Bloom’s status as an alderman.144 
The court went on to express its concern that the government’s 
theory would turn lawful actions under state law into federal crimes.145 
According to the court, that is the situation where the fiduciary status 
would matter because under the honest services fraud doctrine the 
government does not have to lose money or property, but only its 
employee’s loyalty.146 The court gave as an example the hypothetical 
situation where Bloom only explained the scavenger sale law to his 
client, and told the client not to send a straw purchaser, but instead 
purchase the property back from the independent winning bidder.147 
Another situation hypothesized by the court was where Bloom advised 
his client to move to the suburbs where taxes are cheaper. Under these 
situations, although acting lawfully, according to the prosecution’s 
theory he still deprived City of Chicago of his “complete loyalty.”148 
The court found that this outcome would stretch the honest services 
fraud doctrine “beyond sensible bounds.”149 
The weakness of this analysis is that the court does not articulate 
why the limiting principle of the violation of another law along with 
the fiduciary duty breach would not address this concern.150 If that 




145 Id. at 655. 




150 See, e.g., United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 691-93 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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standard had been adopted then there can be no concern that the public 
official was acting lawfully. In fact, the dissenting opinion highlights 
that Bloom likely violated an independent law concerning an official’s 
interest in the purchase of property sold for tax assessments.151 If 
Bloom did indeed violate this law, then he was acting unlawfully while 
simultaneously breaching his fiduciary duty and the majority’s 
hypothetical concern that Bloom was acting lawfully and breaching a 
fiduciary duty is negated. 
But the dissenting opinion is based on the assumption that a 
lawyer has an interest in the results of his advice.152 If one takes this 
assumption and applies it to the majority’s hypo where Bloom acts 
lawfully by just describing the scavenger sale law and explaining how 
the client can purchase the property from the winning bidder, then 
Bloom may have still committed honest services fraud. If he has an 
interest in his advice, even if that advice was to act lawfully, and that 
                                                 
151 Bloom, 149 F.3d at 657-59 (Bauer, J., dissenting). Judge Bauer believes that 
Bloom violated 65 ILCS 5/3.1-55-10. The pertinent part of the statute cited by Judge 
Bauer is: 
Interests in contracts 
 
(a) A municipal officer shall not be interested, directly or 
indirectly, in the officer's own name or in the name of any 
other person, association, trust, or corporation, in any contract, 
work or business of the municipality or in the sale of any 
article whenever the expense, price, or consideration of the 
contract, work business, or sale is paid either from the treasury 
or by an assessment levied by statute or ordinance. A 
municipal officer shall not be interested, directly or indirectly, 
in the purchase of any property that (i) belongs to the 
municipality, (ii) is sold for taxes or assessments, or (iii) is 
sold by virtue of legal process at the suit of the municipality.  
 . . .  
(e) An officer who violates this Section is guilty of a 
Class 4 felony. In addition, any office held by an officer so 
convicted shall become vacant and shall be so declared as part 
of the judgment of the court. 
 
Id. at 658 (emphasis in original).  
152 Id. at 657-58. 
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advice was used for the purchase of property sold for taxes, then he 
has violated another law and breached his fiduciary duty. Thus, he 
could be charged with honest services fraud despite giving proper 
legal advice. This appears to be the absurd result with which the 
majority was concerned in rejecting the limiting principle of the 
violation of another law and the breach of a fiduciary duty.153  
To determine fiduciary duty breaches that are frauds from those 
that are not, the Seventh Circuit held that the “[m]isuse of office (more 
broadly, misuse of position) for private gain is the line that separates 
run of the mill violations of state-law fiduciary duty . . . from federal 
crime.”154 The court reached this conclusion based on the Supreme 
Court’s description of the honest services fraud doctrine in McNally, 
where the Court stated “a public official owes a fiduciary duty to the 
public, and misuse of his office for private gain is a fraud.”155 In 
reaching this conclusion the Seventh Circuit found that § 1346 did not 
make lawful pre-McNally conduct unlawful post-McNally.156 Thus, 
because Bloom was not charged with misusing his public office for 
private gain, the honest services fraud charge was properly dismissed 
by the district court.157 
Although many appellate courts agree that limiting principles 
need to be applied to § 1346 in order to cabin its reach and to reduce 
federalism and vagueness concerns,158 the Seventh Circuit is the only 
circuit to adopt the “misuse of office for private gain” standard.159 The 
                                                 
153 See id. at 654-55 (majority opinion). 
154 Id. at 655. 
155 Id. (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 355 (1987)). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692-93 (3d Cir. 2002); Bloom, 149 F.3d at 
654-55; United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 732-34 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 
United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 725 (1st Cir. 1996). 
159 United States v. Malone, No. 02:03-CR-00500-LRH-LRL, 2006 WL 
2583293, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2006); Albert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud & 
RICO Racket: Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 113, 115 
(2006). 
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Third Circuit has expressly criticized the Seventh Circuit’s Bloom 
standard.160 
 
B. THIRD CIRCUIT CRITICISM OF BLOOM 
 
In United States v. Panarella, the Third Circuit rejected the 
Seventh Circuit’s Bloom standard, and adopted the violation of a state 
law as its limiting principle.161 In Panarella, Nicholas Panarella ran a 
tax collection business that had expertise in collecting Pennsylvania’s 
business privilege tax from non-Pennsylvania businesses.162 Panarella 
hired Pennsylvania Senate Majority Leader F. Joseph Loeper as a 
consultant for his business.163 Loeper supported the business by 
attending meetings between Panarella and local governments and state 
agencies.164 Loeper also spoke and voted against legislation that would 
have been detrimental to Panarella’s business.165 Loeper and Panarella 
ran into trouble when Loeper failed to disclose, as required under 
Pennsylvania law, the income that he received from Panarella.166 They 
dug themselves a deeper hole when together they tried to cover-up the 
arrangement from a reporter investigating the payments.167 Panarella 
was indicted by the grand jury on honest services fraud charges for 
depriving the public of Loeper’s honest services.168 He pled guilty, but 
appealed arguing that Loeper did not deprive the public of his honest 
services.169 
                                                 
160 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 691-93. 
161 Id. 






168 Id. In addition to the mail fraud charges, Panarella was also indicted on wire 
fraud charges. Id. The wire fraud statute and the mail fraud statute are read together. 
United States v. Brumley, 59 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1995). 
169 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 679. 
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The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that honest services 
fraud typically results from either bribery or the failure to disclose a 
conflict of interest that results in private gain.170 Panarella involved the 
latter issue and the court held that “where a public official takes 
discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a 
financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state 
criminal law, that official has deprived the public of his honest 
services under 18 U.S.C. § 1346.”171 On appeal, Panarella argued that 
the Third Circuit should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s Bloom 
standard.172 The Third Circuit refused because it believed that the 
violation of state law served as a better limiting principle.173 
In rejecting the Bloom standard, the Third Circuit first noted that 
Bloom was factually distinguishable from Panarella because Bloom’s 
actions were not taken as part of his official duties, while Loeper’s 
actions were taken in his official capacity.174 But more importantly, the 
Third Circuit found that the Bloom standard offered “little clarity” in 
determining the scope of § 1346.175 The court went on to state that the 
dispute over the “misuse of office” and the “private gain” added “an 
extra layer of unnecessary complexity to the inquiry.”176 Furthermore, 
the Third Circuit reasoned that the Bloom standard was both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive.177 The court reasoned that the standard 
was over-inclusive because it could hypothetically cover an official 
who seduces an intern or takes home office supplies for personal 
use.178 It was under-inclusive because if the court adopted Panarella’s 
position—that a public official does not misuse his office when he 
                                                 
170 Id. at 690. (citing United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262-63 (3d Cir. 
2001) and United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
171 Id. at 691. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 692-93. 
174 Id. at 691. 
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fails to disclose a conflict of interest—then the Bloom standard would 
not cover a classic fraudulent situation.179 
In adopting state law as its limiting principle, the Third Circuit’s 
answer to the Seventh Circuit’s concerns about the principle’s 
shortcomings was that under a state law limiting principle Bloom 
simply did not commit honest services mail fraud. The Third Circuit 
further concluded that state law better handles vaguenes and 
federalism concerns.180 Because Pennsylvania criminal law required 
Loeper to disclose the income he received from Panarella, both parties 
had “unambiguous notice that Loeper’s nondisclosure was 
criminal.”181 Thus, according to the Third Circuit, vagueness concerns 
were not present in Panarella.182 Additionally, federalism concerns 
were mitigated because the additional violation of a state law is 
“conduct that the state itself has chosen to criminalize.”183 Moreover, 
federal prosecutions in the area of political corruption can play a 
“beneficial role” because state officials are often either unwilling or 
unable to prosecute these cases.184 
Two issues were left unresolved by the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Panarella. First, whether nondisclosure always requires the violation 
of a state law in order to amount to honest services fraud,185 and 
second, whether the violated state law must be a criminal law. The 
second question was answered in the negative in United States v. 
                                                 
179 Id. A traditional fraudulent situation occurs when a fiduciary fails to 
disclose a conflict of interest. Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 698. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 694. 
184 Id. For a detailed analysis of this problem see Michael W. Carey et al., 
Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Officials: Obstacles to Punishing 
Breaches of the Public Trust and a Proposal for Reform, Part One, 94 W. VA. L. 
REV. 301 (1992).  
185 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 699 n.9. The Third Circuit further declined to 
answer the question in United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Gordon, when the Third Circuit held that honest services fraud only 
requires the violation of a state-created fiduciary duty.186 
After Gordon, the Third Circuit’s standard for determining the 
outer reaches of the honest services fraud doctrine seems to be 
somewhat settled, although certain questions remain.187 Likewise, after 
Thompson, the same can be said of the Seventh Circuit.188 The 
extraordinary facts of Thompson, however, suggest that the case lies at 
the outer edges of the honest services fraud doctrine. Therefore, the 
                                                 
186 183 Fed. Appx. 202, 211, No. 05-3927, 2006 WL 1558952, at *8 (3d Cir. 
2006). Gordon was not selected to be published and is therefore not precedent in the 
Third Circuit. 3d Cir. Internal Operating P. 5.7 (citation of non-precedential 3d Cir. 
opinions). 
187 For example, it is at least arguable that the Third Circuit has left open the 
question of whether a violation of a state-law-created fiduciary duty is required in 
non-disclosure cases. In Gordon, the Third Circuit states that in Murphy, 323 F. 3d 
102, the court approved of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Brumley, 
116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc), that “§ 1346 ‘contemplates that there must 
first be a breach of a state-owned duty.’” Gordon, 183 Fed. Appx. at 211 n.6, 2006 
WL 1558952, at *7 n.6. But in Murphy, the court says that it will not address the 
issue of whether a violation of a state-law-created fiduciary is required. Murphy, 323 
F.3d at 117. Thus, the holding in Gordon is potentially weakened because the 
Murphy court specifically stated that it would not address the issue. Furthermore, the 
Third Circuit potentially misreads Brumley, 116 F.3d 728. In Brumley the Fifth 
Circuit held that for honest services fraud the “services must be owed under state law 
and the government must prove . . . that they were not delivered. 116 F.3d at 734. 
Therefore, the language quoted by the Third Circuit in Gordon that the Fifth Circuit 
requires a breach of a fiduciary duty is likely dictum in the Fifth Circuit because the 
Fifth Circuit did not reach the question of whether a breach of a state created 
fiduciary duty is required; it simple held that state-owed “services” must not have 
been delivered. Id. at 734. The Third Circuit is not the only court to make this 
mistake. See, e.g., United States v. Kott, No. 3:07-cr-00056 JWS, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 66125, at *12-13 (D. Alaska Sept. 4, 2007). 
Another open question is which state laws create fiduciary duties and under 
what circumstances. See, e.g., Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117 (rejecting the government’s 
argument that the New Jersey Bribery Act creates a fiduciary duty between a 
political party official and the public). 
188 Although the Seventh Circuit held that neither salary increases (for doing a 
good job) nor psychic benefits are a private gain, the ultimate contours of the private 
gain test remain unclear. See United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
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Thompson case provides an opportunity to compare and contrast the 
Seventh Circuit’s Bloom standard with the Third Circuit’s Panarella 
standard to determine if one of the tests is theoretically or practically 
better than the other. 
 
III. COMPARISON OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S BLOOM STANDARD WITH 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S PANARELLA STANDARD 
 
A. Applying the Third Circuit’s Test to the Facts of Thompson 
 
In Thompson, a Wisconsin civil servant supervised the process of 
awarding a state travel contract.189 Administrative rules dictated that 
the contract was to be awarded to the company with the greatest 
number of points out of three weighted categories.190 Two companies 
emerged as the leading bidders for the contract.191 The first, Aldelman 
Travel, was a local Wisconsin company that had made political 
donations to the governor; the other company, Omega World Travel, 
was based on the East Coast.192 After the evaluation process, although 
the Adelman had the lowest price and a better service score, Omega 
received the highest overall score because they delivered a better oral 
presentation.193 
But, for unstated “political reasons,” Thompson did not want to 
award the contract to Omega.194 To prevent this outcome, she first 
negotiated with the other members of the evaluation committee in an 
attempt to get them to change their scores.195 Her negotiations failed, 
but another member of the committee suggested that the contract be 
                                                 
189 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 878. 
190 Id. The points scale provided for 1200 maximum points: 300 points for 
price, 700 points for service, and 200 points for the oral presentation. Id. 




195 Id. at 879. 
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re-bid on a best-and-final basis, as permitted by state law.196 Adelman 
lowered its price, and a virtual tie with Omega ensued.197 Thompson 
then used Wisconsin’s administrative tie-breaking procedure to award 
the contract to Adelman with the consent of her political appointee 
supervisor.198 As a result of steering the contract to Adelman, 
Thompson was convicted of honest services mail fraud.199 The 
Seventh Circuit reversed Thompson’s conviction, finding that under 
the Bloom standard she neither misused her office, nor had a private 
gain.200 But how would this case have come out if it had arisen in the 
Third Circuit? 
First, the government would have had to find a state-law-created 
fiduciary duty that Thompson might have violated.201 Assuming that 
government found one, it would next have to prove that she breached 
that duty. As the Third Circuit and others have noted, most cases of 
honest services fraud result from either bribery or the failure to 
disclose a conflict of interest.202 Although Thompson was also 
convicted under a bribery and theft statute, she was convicted under 
the theory that she “misapplied” federal funds and not on a bribery 
theory.203 The Seventh Circuit found that there was no indication that 
                                                 
196 Id. 
197 Id. “The tie depended on rounding to the nearest whole number. 
[Adelman’s] score was 1026.6, while [Omega’s] score was 1027.3”. Id. 
198 Id. The tie-breaking procedure “gave weight to items not previously figured 
into the price comparison.” Id. 
199 Id. at 878. 
200 Id. at 883-84. 
201 See United States v. Gordon, 183 Fed. Appx. 202, 211, No. 05-3927, 2006 
WL 1558952, at *8 (3d Cir. June 8, 2006). One possible option is the section of the 
Wisconsin Ethics Code that states in pertinent part that “[n]o state public official 
may use or attempt to use the public position held by the public official to influence 
or gain unlawful benefits, advantages or privileges personally or for others.” WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 19.45(5) (2003). 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 690 (3d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1998). 
203 See supra note 26. 
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Thompson or anyone else had accepted a bribe.204 Thus, the 
government would likely have had to rely on the “failure to disclose a 
conflict of interest” theory. 
Building a case on the failure to disclose theory would be 
problematic for the government for several reasons. First, as a civil 
servant, it is questionable whether Thompson would be subject to the 
same disclosure requirements as an elected official under Wisconsin 
law.205 Second, it is debatable whether her “political” motivations 
created a conflict in the first place because she was not bribed and did 
not have any connection to Adelman.206 But perhaps most fatal to the 
government’s case is the fact that Thompson did disclose her “political 
concerns” to the evaluation committee.207 
A problem that arises in analyzing Thompson under Third Circuit 
precedent in non-disclosure cases is that Wisconsin’s disclosure laws 
appear more lenient that Pennsylvania’s disclosure laws.208 For 
example, Pennsylvania defines the term “public employee” in a way 
that would clearly cover Thompson, and require her to comply with its 
disclosure laws.209 Wisconsin’s disclosure laws do not define the term 
“pubic employee,” and it is not as clear if she would have to comply 
with them.210 But the Third Circuit’s language in United States v. 
Antico—that “[d]uties to disclose material information affecting an 
official's impartial decision-making . . . exist . . . regardless of a state 
                                                 
204 Id. 
205 The Wisconsin Code of Ethics does not define the term “public employee” 
so it is unclear whether or not a Thompson would have to file a disclosure statement. 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.42 (West Supp. 2007). See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.43 (West 
Supp. 2007) for Wisconsin’s disclosure requirements. On the other hand, 
Pennsylvania, the location of Panarella, does define the term “public employee” in 
its ethical code. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West Supp. 2007). Public 
employees are required to file disclosure statements. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
1104(a) (2000). 
206 See Thompson, 484 F.3d at 879. 
207 Id. at 878-79. 
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or local law codifying a conflict of interest”—makes clear that some 
type of disclosure is needed.211 Thus, if Thompson did not have to 
comply with Wisconsin’s disclosure laws, to who was she supposed to 
disclose the potential conflict. 
In this circumstance, Antico suggests that disclosing to a 
supervisor may be sufficient.212 In that case Frank Antico worked in 
various positions in Philadelphia’s Department of Licenses and 
Inspections.213 In several of the positions he held “discretionary 
authority to approve zoning and use permits and licenses.”214 Antico 
failed to pay child support to his children living with his ex-
girlfriend.215 She sued and was awarded child support.216 After making 
several payments, Antico, with her consent, set her up in a business 
expediting permits and licenses for other businesses so that he did not 
have to continue paying child support.217 To support her business 
Antico referred clients to her, and then he would complete all of the 
paperwork in her name.218 Antico’s co-workers knew about the 
arrangement, but his supervisors did not.219 The court stated that the 
fact that Antico’s co-workers knew about the arrangement “does not 
vindicate his failure to disclose” the relationship to his supervisors.220 
Two complications arise in comparing Thompson and Antico. 
First, Antico was required to comply with disclosure laws.221 It is not 
as clear, as stated above, that Thompson was under a similar 
requirement. Second, assuming there was a conflict, disclosing it to 
                                                 
211 United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing to United 
States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
212 See id. at 264-65. 
213 Id. at 249. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 253. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 253-54. 
219 Id. at 265. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 263. 
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her supervisor may not have solved the problem because he may have 
wanted to reward one of the governor’s political supporters.222 But 
Thompson did disclose her “political” concerns to the other members 
of the evaluation committee.223 Although the committee members may 
be more like the co-workers in Antico, the disclosure in Thompson 
seems address the Third Circuit’s concern in Antico that non-
disclosure evinces an “intent to deceive.”224 
In Thompson, each of the committee members scored the 
proposals on the same criteria, and there is no evidence to suggest that 
any one member could overrule another.225 Otherwise, there would 
have been no reason for Thompson to attempt to negotiate with the 
other members of the evaluation committee to get them to change their 
scores.226 The only reason that Adelman was awarded the contract was 
because when the contract was put out for re-bid, as permitted by state 
law, they lowered their score and a tie with Omega ensued.227 If 
Aldeman did not lower their score, thus allowing Thompson to award 
them the contract based on the state law tie-breaking procedure that 
allowed other factors to be considered, it is almost certain that Omega 
would have been awarded the contract regardless of Thompson’s 
actions.228 In contrast, Antico had the discretionary power to approve 
permits and licenses without requiring someone else’s approval or 
knowledge.229 And he used the power to benefit himself so that he 
would not have to pay child support.230 
The policy behind disclosure is that the public should be assured 
that elected officials and public employees are making decisions in the 
                                                 
222 See Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 879 (7th Cir. 2007). 
223 Id. at 878-79. 
224 Antico, 275 F.3d at 265. 
225 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 878-79. 
226 See id. at 879. 
227 Id. 
228 See id. 
229 Antico, 275 F.3d at 249. 
230 Id. at 263. 
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best interest of the public, and not in their own self-interest.231 
Because Thompson’s disclosed her “political” concerns to the 
evaluation committee, her actions seem to comply with this policy 
concern. Therefore, based upon the above considerations, it appears 
likely that if Thompson had been convicted of honest services fraud in 
the Third Circuit, that court too would have reversed her conviction 
because her disclosure to the evaluation committee seems to negate 
their concern that she had an intent to deceive. Because it appears that 
the Third Circuit and the Seventh Circuit would come to the same 
conclusion under the Thompson facts, the next question is whether the 
facts of Panarella would lead to the same results if they had arisen in 
the Seventh Circuit. 
 
B. Applying the Seventh Circuit’s Test to the Facts of Panarella 
 
In Panarella, a business owner (Panarella) hired a State Senator 
(Loeper) as a consultant.232 Loeper failed to disclose his $330,000 in 
income from this arrangement, as required under Pennsylvania law, 
and both Panarella and the Loeper took actions to conceal the 
relationship from the press.233 Panarella pled guilty to the charge that 
he engaged in a scheme to deprive the public of the Loeper’s honest 
services.234 But, on appeal, he argued that Loeper’s actions did not 
amount to honest services fraud because there was no evidence that he 
either bought, or that their arrangement influenced, Loeper’s vote on a 
bill that if enacted would have been detrimental to Panarella’s 
business.235 
If Panarella had arisen in the Seventh Circuit, it is very likely that 
the court would have found that Loeper misused his office for private 
                                                 
231 United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 697 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing to the 
purpose behind Pennsylvania’s Public Official and Employee Ethics Act).  
232 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 681. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 690-91. 
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gain and upheld Panarella’s conviction, as the Third Circuit did.236 The 
facts of Panararella are very similar to the facts of Isaacs, where the 
Seventh Circuit upheld former Illinois governor Otto Kerner’s 
conviction for honest services fraud.237 In Isaacs, Kerner engaged in a 
complicated scheme involving stock transactions that netted him a 
profit of over $150,000 in exchange for helping various racing 
interests.238 Kerner claimed he did not commit honest services fraud 
because the state did not lose any money.239 The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed, and upheld the conviction, finding that “[t]here was 
evidence [that both] the State of Illinois and its citizens were deprived 
of the loyal and honest services of their governor, [and] that the 
defendants actually did exert special influence in favor of and 
bestowed preferential treatment on [certain racing interests].”240 
Like Kerner, Panarella engaged in a scheme to use the power of 
government to benefit his private interests.241 The only difference 
between the two defendants is that they were on different sides of the 
transaction. Kerner was a public official who purchased and sold stock 
in a corporation, and used his position and the power of government to 
benefit that corporation.242 Panarella was a business owner, who hired 
Loeper, the State Senate Majority Leader, to promote his business 
interests.243 Loeper promoted Panarella’s business interests by 
attending meetings between Panarella and state and local officials. 244 
Additionally, Loeper furthered Panarella’s business interests by voting 
against and helping to defeat legislation that would have had a 
                                                 
236 Id. at 680-81. 
237 United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1152 (7th Cir. 1974). 
238 Id. at 1139. 
239 Id. at 1149. Not only did the state not lose any money, but in fact its racing 
revenues doubled as a result of Kerner’s actions. Id. at 1139. 
240 Id. at 1150. 
241 Id. at 1131-40; Panarella, 277 F.3d at 680-82. 
242 Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1135-39. 
243 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 681. 
244 Id. 
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substantial negative impact on the business.245 Finally, like Kerner, 
Panarella and Loeper took clandestine steps— that included making 
the payments through a third party—to hide the arrangement from the 
public.246 
Isaacs, however, was decided before McNally; therefore, one 
must examine post-McNally law to ensure an accurate comparison. As 
previously stated, the Seventh Circuit determined in Bloom that the 
misuse of office for private gain is its standard for delineating criminal 
from non-criminal behavior.247 In discussing the “misuse of office” in 
Bloom, the Seventh Circuit stated, “[i]n almost all of the intangible 
rights cases this circuit has decided (before McNally or since § 1346), 
the defendant used his office for private gain, as by accepting a bribe 
in exchange for official action.”248 The court cited to Isaacs in support 
of this proposition.249 
In Thompson, the Seventh Circuit noted that “the history of 
honest-services prosecutions is one in which the ‘private gain’ comes 
from third parties who suborn the employee with side payments, often 
derived via kickbacks skimmed from a public contract.”250 The facts 
of Panarella do not suggest that the $330,000 in “consulting fees” that 
Panarella paid to Loeper were part of a kickback scheme.251 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit would likely have found that 
Panarella’s payments to Loeper were bribes. First the payments were 
made to Loeper through a third party,252 and this seems very similar to 
the stock payment scheme that the court found to be a bribe in 
                                                 
245 Id. 
246 Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1152 (noting that the scheme depended upon “continued 
concealment” and “devious and complicated [financial] devices”); Panarella, 277 
F.3d at 681. 
247 United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998). 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007) 
251 277 F.3d 678, 681 (3d Cir. 2002). 
252 Id. 
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Isaacs.253 Second, as a result of the payments, Loeper took actions as a 
public official to benefit his private interests.254 Thus, Panarella 
involves a situation where a public official received a private gain 
from a third party and in exchange for taking action in his official 
capacity, and thereby satisfying the Bloom standard. Therefore, the 
Seventh Circuit, like the Third Circuit, would likely uphold Panarella’s 
conviction for engaging in a scheme to deprive the public of Loeper’s 
honest services. 
 
C. Analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s and the Third Circuit’s Differing 
Standards for Honest Services Fraud 
 
The above analyses have shown that, at least under the limited 
facts of Thompson and Panarella, both the Seventh Circuit’s “misuse 
of office for private gain” standard and the Third Circuit’s “state law” 
standard likely lead to the same outcomes. Because Thompson lies at 
the other edges of the honest services doctrine, this suggests that in 
most cases neither of the tests is better in practice than the other. This, 
of course, assumes that the courts reached the right outcomes in both 
cases. One possible conclusion is that the courts have generally gotten 
the right answer despite applying different standards.255 But, if neither 
of the tests is better in practice, the next question is whether one of the 
tests is better in theory. 
The answer to that question appears to be no. Both courts agree 
with the theory that public officials owe fiduciary duties to the 
citizenry.256 What they appear to disagree on, however, is the 
semantics of how to define the fiduciary duties that are owed to the 
public, and what other elements are necessary, if any, to limit the reach 
of § 1346 and to prevent minor infractions from becoming major 
federal crimes.257 The Third Circuit believes that limiting fiduciary 
                                                 
253 See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1144-46 (7th Cir. 1974). 
254 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 681. 
255 Tendler, supra note 2, at 2765. 
256 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692; Bloom, 149 F.3d 654-55. 
257 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93; Bloom, 149 F.3d at 654-55. 
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duties to those that arise under state law is the best way to resolve 
vagueness and federalism concerns.258 The vagueness concern is 
abated because the defendants have knowledge that their actions are 
illegal.259 The federalism concerns are lessened because the state has 
spoken on what actions it considers illegal.260 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit does not limit fiduciary 
duties only to those that arise under state law, but leaves open the 
possibility of reaching that conclusion in the future.261 But because the 
Seventh Circuit does not limit the fiduciary duties to those created by 
state law, and therefore allows for the breach of more fiduciary duties, 
it needs a way to prevent the breach of every fiduciary duty from 
becoming a federal crime. The Seventh Circuit does this by adding the 
private gain requirement.262 Furthermore, Thompson indicates that the 
private gain must come from a third party.263 
Although different, both courts’ standards are grounded in sound 
principles of statutory interpretation. The Seventh Circuit concluded 
by passing § 1346 Congress intended only to criminalize conduct that 
would have been criminal prior to McNally.264 To determine what was 
criminal prior to McNally, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme 
Court’s description of the honest services fraud doctrine that in 
McNally.265 The Seventh Circuit then reasoned that this description of 
the honest services fraud doctrine is what Congress resurrected in 
passing § 1346.266 Conversely, the Third Circuit has relied more on 
                                                 
258 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93. 
259 Id. at 698. 
260 Id. at 694. 
261 See United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 1999). 
262 Bloom, 149 F.3d at 655. Under this reading of the Bloom standard the 
“misuse of office” element is the breach of the fiduciary duty. 
263 United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007). 
264 Bloom, 149 F.3d at 655. 
265 Id. (“[i]n McNally the Supreme Court described the intangible rights theory 
this way: ‘a public official owes a fiduciary duty to the public, and misuse of his 
office for private gain is a fraud’”) (citing to McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 
350, 355 (1987). 
266 Id. 
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criminal and political theory to determine that state law is the better 
line for determining what conduct amounts to honest services fraud.267 
Because both standards have sound theoretical bases, and appear to 
lead to same outcomes under the same set of facts, it is difficult to 
conclude that either standard is better in theory. 
One simple solution to the problem raised by Thompson,268 is for 
the Seventh Circuit to simply adopt the Third Circuit’s state law 
limiting principal. This solution has the benefit of preventing the 
problem raised by Thompson because a different standard not 
involving private gain is used. But this recommendation is inadequate 
as a long-term solution to general problems raised by the honest 
services doctrine because the state law limiting principle raises its own 
set of problems, although separate and distinct from the problems 
raised by the misuse of office for private gain limiting principle. For 
example, the Third Circuit struggles with determining which state laws 
create fiduciary duties and which laws do not, and under what 
circumstances those duties arise and under what circumstances they do 
not arise.269 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit wrestles with 
defining what constitutes a “misuse of office” and a “private gain.”270 
Ultimately, these are issues that the Supreme Court will face if it 
grants certiorari to an honest services fraud case. 
In the meantime, because neither circuit is likely to adopt another 
standard, it is beneficial to determine the potential effect of Thompson 
on honest services fraud law in the Seventh Circuit. In Thompson, the 
court held “that neither an increase in salary for doing what one’s 
superiors deem a good job, nor an addition to one’s peace of mind, is a 
                                                 
267 United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692-98 (3d Cir. 2002). 
268 See infra Section IV. 
269 See supra note 187. 
270 United States v. Rezko, No. 05 CR 691, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73517, at 
*13-15 (Oct. 2, 2007) (the defendant does not have to personally gain, instead the 
only requirement is that any participant in the scheme realizes a private gain); United 
States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826, 835 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming Thompson’s refinement 
of Bloom, but finding the instant case to vary in both degree and kind from 
Thompson; here a $30 million fraud that the defendant intentionally participated in 
versus $1,000 pay raise where the defendant “did not act out of private gain”). 
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‘private benefit’ for the purpose of § 1346.” In the abstract this seems 
like a logical holding. But this holding has the potential to open a 
loophole that will perpetuate the graft and corruption that Congress 
intended to prevent when it reinstated the honest services fraud 
doctrine through the enactment of § 1346. 
 
IV. PRIVATE GAIN IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
A. Northern District of Illinois Decides that Current or Future Jobs 
can be a Private Gain 
 
Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Thompson, on three 
occasions, courts in the Northern District of Illinois held that one’s job 
or the potential of future employment can be a private gain under the 
Bloom standard.271 The first case, United States v. Bauer,272 was one of 
the first cases to arise out of the Illinois licenses-for-bribes scandal273 
that would ultimately lead to the conviction of former governor 
George Ryan for honest services fraud.274 Dean Bauer served as the 
Inspector General in the Illinois Secretary of State’s Office.275 As 
Inspector General, one of his duties was to investigate instances of 
employee misconduct.276 Bauer was indicted for honest services fraud 
for failing to investigate, and for his conduct in burying, allegations 
that various licensing facilities were accepting bribes in exchange for 
driver’s licenses.277 The court accepted the government’s argument 
                                                 
271 United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 829-30 (N.D. Ill. 2006); 
United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004); United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16784, at *9-12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2000). 
272 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2000). 
273 For a partial list of the key dates in the licenses for bribes scandal see 
License Scandal Chronology, ST. J.-REG., Apr. 26, 2002, at 3. 
274 United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 697-99 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding 
Governor Ryan’s convictions). 
275 Bauer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1. 
276 Id. at *3. 
277 Id. at *9-13. 
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that Bauer stood to gain because his actions provided a “political 
advantage” to his political patron.278 Thus, he stood to, and did gain, 
when George Ryan was elected Governor.279 
The second case, United States v. Munson, occurred in the private 
sector. Michael Munson, an attorney, was indicted for honest services 
fraud because of a scheme he allegedly engaged in with executives of 
Nicor Energy in order to manipulate certain financial information.280 
Munson claimed that he could not be charged with honest services 
fraud because he did not personally gain, or receive any direct 
monetary compensation, such as a bribe or kickback.281 The 
government argued that Munson’s personal gains were the legal fees 
he received, and his hope that by currying favor with the executives he 
would receive future independent legal work from Nicor or become its 
general counsel.282 The court summarized Bauer’s holding as “acts 
intended to curry political favor in hopes of increasing the defendant’s 
current job security or of leading to future promotions [are] sufficient 
personal gain to satisfy § 1346,” and accepted the government’s 
argument.283 
The third case, United States v. Sorich, arose out of the City of 
Chicago’s patronage scandal.284 Robert Sorich, Assistant to the 
Director of the City’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, was 
indicted for honest services fraud for ensuring that city jobs went to 
certain political supporters.285 Sorich argued that charges could not be 
sustained because the prosecution did not allege that the City of 
                                                 
278 Id. at *11-12. 
279 Id. After George Ryan was elected Governor, Bauer was promoted to a 
position in the Illinois Department of Transportation. Id. at *4. A few months later 
he resigned after having qualified for a state pension. Id. 
280 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004). 
281 Id. at *2. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. at *3. 
284 United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-24 (N.D. Ill. 2006). See 
also Rudolph Bush & Dan Mihalopoulos, Daley Jobs Chief Guilty, CHI. TRIB., July 
7, 2006, at 1. 
285 Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 823. 
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Chicago or its residents suffered a loss, or that he personally gained.286 
The court found that Sorich “[was] well aware of the gains to be had 
from [his] machinations” and, citing to both Bauer and Munson, 
allowed the prosecution to go forward.287 Additionally, the court found 
that although “subsequent career security or advancement” is not as 
easy to quantify as a bribery or kickback scheme, it nevertheless could 
serve as a private gain for honest services fraud.288 
In Thompson, the government cited to Sorich and Munson for the 
proposition that Thompson’s increased salary was a private gain for 
honest services fraud.289 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding 
neither case persuasive.290 But the court did not explain its reason for 
this finding.291 The simple explanation could be that the Northern 
District of Illinois’ holdings in Sorich, Munson and, by extension, 
Bauer are overruled.292 But if those holdings are not overruled—and 
the court’s statement that Sorich and Munson are “unpersuasive”293 
suggest that they are not—then the Seventh Circuit may have 
inadvertently opened a loophole that will allow subtle corruption 
schemes to go unpunished. 
 
B. Distinguishing Thompson 
 
One way to distinguish Thompson from Sorich and Bauer, but not 
from Munson, is based on the jobs that each defendant held. 
Thompson held a civil servant job, while both Sorich and Bauer held 
                                                 
286 Id. at 828. 
287 Id. at 829. 
288 Id. at 830. 
289 United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007). 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Some experts believe that this ruling may lead to the reversal of Sorich’s 
conviction. See Ward, supra note 33, at 20. 
293 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884. 
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politically-appointed positions.294 As a civil servant, Thompson had 
independent job security.295 On the other hand, Sorich’s and Bauer’s 
job security rested on their political patrons remaining in power.296 If 
Thompson is distinguishable from Sorich and Bauer for this reason, 
then the Seventh Circuit may have created an opening for “subtle 
schemes” that now cannot be punished as honest services fraud. 
One such scheme is where civil servants engage on their own, and 
without any pressure from their political supervisors, in conduct such 
as awarding contracts to or perhaps hiring the friends and supporters 
of their current political patrons. The political appointees then notice 
that their friends and supporters are benefiting, and as a result reward 
the civil servants with extra or higher bonuses through “normal 
personnel practices.”297 Under Thompson, this would not be a private 
gain because the court stated that “getting a raise through normal 
personnel practices does not sound like an aspect of a ‘scheme or 
artifice.’”298 Yet, these “sublte schemes”—where the civil servants are 
receiving a private gain in the form of salary increase that they would 
otherwise not have received—would propagate the corruption and 
graft that § 1346 was enacted to counter.299 One limitation to this 
scenario is that the civil servants could not be substantially 
compensated because their raises or bonuses would have to be given 
through normal personnel practices. But what is considered normal 
may vary widely, and this added condition would certainly create 
another obstacle for the government to consider in determining 
whether to prosecute, and ultimately for it to prove at trial. 
In addition to civil servants acting on their own, another 
possibility is that the political appointees may create a “wink and nod” 
                                                 
294 Id. at 882; Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30; United States v. Bauer, No. 
00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2000). 
295 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 882. 
296 Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30; Bauer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at 
*11-12. 
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work environment, or apply subtle pressure so that the civil servants 
know what to do and are compensated for the effort. Regardless of 
whether subtle pressure is applied or whether the civil servants create 
the system on their own, the end result is the same—the continuation 
of public corruption that can no longer be punished as honest services 
fraud. 
The above scenario rests on the assumption that Thompson did not 
overrule Sorich and Bauer. But again, the simplest explanation may be 
that Thompson did overrule those cases. Because Munson cannot be 
readily distinguished from Thompson, this argument may have more 
weight. The only apparent distinction between Thompson and Munson 
is that Munson occurred in the private sector where Thompson 
occurred in the public sector. Other than a public/private distinction, 
there does not appear to be much difference between the cases. Both 
defendants received a small financial benefit, but it was not the result 
of a bribe or a kickback.300 Thompson received a $1,000 increase to 
her salary.301 While Munson received the legal fees for working on 
various documents, and had hope of becoming Nicor’s General 
Counsel.302 
In other circuits, the public/private distinction may matter because 
it is more difficult prove private honest services fraud than it is to 
prove public honest services fraud because the fiduciary duties are 
different.303 But the Seventh Circuit appears to treat public and private 
honest services fraud in the same manner by subjecting both to the 
Bloom standard.304 If, however, in the Seventh Circuit, the 
public/private distinction does matter, then Thompson almost certainly 
                                                 
300 Id. at 879; United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14274, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004). 
301 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 879. 
302 Munson, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274 at *2. 
303 United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996). 
304 See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(public); United States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2007) (private); 
United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2003) (private); United 
States v. Rezko, No. 05 CR 691, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73517, at *10-16 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 2, 2007) (private). 
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overrules the Northern District cases because otherwise it would turn 
honest services fraud law on its head. It is simply illogical to say that 
Thompson’s raise was not a private gain, but that Bauer’s law fees and 
hope for new employment was a gain. 
But because the Seventh Circuit in Thompson only found Sorich 
and Munson unpersuasive, and did not explain its reasoning or state 
that prior law was overruled, the public/private distinction remains an 
open issue, as does the public servant/political appointee distinction.305 
One solution that may have avoided the “subtle scheme” problem, 
reached the same outcome as the Seventh Circuit did in Thompson, 
and distinguished Sorich, Muson, and Bauer, would have been to 
decide as a threshold matter whether Thompson engaged in a 
“scheme.” 
 
V. DETERMINING IF THERE IS A “SCHEME” AS A THRESHOLD MATTER 
 
A. Scheme Defined as an Artful Plot or Plan to Deceive Others 
 
The mail fraud statute states in pertinent part that: 
 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . for the purpose of 
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so 
to do, places in any post office . . . any matter . . . to 
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service . . . shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned.306 
 
The United States Code, however, does not define the terms “scheme” 
or “artifice.” But, the terms may generally be understood to mean 
“[a]n artful plot or plan, [usually] to deceive others.”307 
Taking the terms under their common meanings, the Seventh 
Circuit may have avoided the questions raised after Thompson if the 
                                                 
305 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884. 
306 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (emphasis added). 
307 See supra note 49. 
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court had decided as a threshold matter whether Thompson had 
engaged in a “scheme.” If Thompson did not engage in a scheme than 
the other issues are moot—there would be no need to determine 
whether she had misused her office or had a private gain because there 
would be no fraud. Under this analysis, “scheme” becomes a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition. If a scheme is not found, then 
the analysis can stop. Conversly, if a scheme is found the court must 
continue the analysis to determine if the purpose of the scheme was to 
defraud another. The analysis could also be applied in the Third 
Circuit because if there is no scheme, then there is no need to 
determine whether any fiduciary duties have been breached. 
In Thompson, the prosecution did not argue that there was any 
malfeasance regarding the political contributions made by the owner 
of Adelman, or that there was any form of a kickback scheme.308 
Neither did the prosecution allege that Thompson had knowledge of, 
or allowed the contributions to enter into her decision making 
process.309 To explain the “political” considerations that Thompson 
referred to, the court assumed that Thompson knew that her boss, a 
political appointee, preferred Adelman Travel.310 
The court next speculated that Thompon’s boss might have had 
three political reasons for wanting to award the contract to 
Adelman.311 The first reason was that he might have wanted to reward 
one of the governor’s supporters.312 The court stated that if this was 
the reason it would be problematic.313 The second reason was that he 
may have wanted to gain politically by driving down the cost of 
government, and thus helping his boss—the incumbent governor.314 
This could be accomplished by selecting Adelman because it bid the 
                                                 
308 See supra note 26. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 879-80. 
312 Id. at 879. 
313 Id. 
314 Id. at 879-80. 
47
Lapointe: Missing the Forest for the Trees: The Seventh Circuit’s Refinemen
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 133
lowest price.315 The court stated that this may be good politics and was 
not a crime.316 The final political reason might have been to select a 
local firm over an out-of-state firm.317 The court stated that this too 
may have been good politics and did not violate federal law.318 Finally, 
the court stated that under the evidence presented no jury could find 
beyond a reasonable doubt which of the three political reasons was 
relied on in awarding the contract to Adelman.319 Moreover, the court 
concluded that Thompson and her boss may not have shared the same 
political reason.320 Furthermore, the court stated that Thompson may 
have selected Aldelman solely to please her boss, regardless of his 
reasons for wanting to select Adelman.321 
The Seventh Circuit based its opinion upon on the assumption that 
Thompson was just trying to please her boss. This is evinced by the 
court’s holding “that neither an increase in salary for doing what one’s 
superiors deem a good job, nor an addition to one’s peace of mind, is a 
‘private benefit’ for the purpose of § 1346.”322 Based on this holding, 
it seems clear that the Seventh Circuit would have found that 
Thompson did not engage in a “scheme” because her actions do not 
evince any conduct that demonstrates that she devised or participated 
in a plan to deceive another.  
On the other hand, the facts of Bauer, Munson, and Sorich show 
that each of those defendants did engage in a “scheme.” Bauer took 
steps to bury investigations into the Secretary of State’s office in order 
to spare the office from embarrassment.323 Hiding information from 
investigators certainly fits the definition of a plan to deceive others. 
                                                 
315 Id. at 878. 






322 Id. at 884 (emphasis added). 
323 United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2000). 
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Munson allegedly assisted three Nicor executives in inflating the 
company’s earnings in violation of generally-accepted accounting 
principles.324 Munson assisted the endeavor through the manipulation 
of legal documents.325 These actions also fit the definition of engaging 
in a plan to deceive others. Finally, Sorich allegedly participated in the 
rigging of non-policy-making city jobs.326 His actions included 
ordering others to conceal the names of job candidates submitted to his 
office and the meetings regarding this process, creating a “sham” 
process for hiring and promotion, and creating a “color-coded” 
tracking system “to [ensure] that each group jostling for favors 
remained both relatively satisfied and indebted.”327 Sorich’s actions 
also demonstrate a plan to deceive others. 
The above analysis suggests Thompson can be distinguished from 
Bauer, Munson, and Sorich on the ground that Thompson did not, but 
that Bauer, Munson and Sorich did, participate in a scheme. Thus, if 
the Seventh Circuit had made this threshold determination it could 
have avoided the potential problem that arises after Thompson. As 
previously stated, this problem is the Machiavellian or “subtle 
scheme” engaged in by civil servants to award the friends and 
supporters of their current political supervisors, and to be rewarded for 
their efforts through normal compensation procedures.328 If the civil 
servant/political appointee dichotomy is the distinction between the 
Thompson case and the lower court cases, then after Thompson the 
government will be unable to prosecute these schemes as honest 
services fraud. 
A potential weakness of the proposed solution is that in Thompson 
the government’s position was very similar to the above noted “subtle 
scheme.” In Thompson, however, the government took the argument 
one step further by reasoning that Thompson’s objectives were 
                                                 
324 United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14274, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004). 
325 Id. at *1-2. 
326 United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 2006). 
327 Id. at 824, 825, 829. 
328 See supra Section IV(B). 
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irrelevant. 329 The government claimed that the only issue that 
mattered was that she did not follow the administrative rules exactly as 
they were laid down.330 Therefore, if the courts are going to make a 
threshold determination that a defendant engaged in a “scheme,” they 
will need a method to determine whether the plan is “artful” or 
“deceptive.” Adopting a business judgment rule for public employees 
may be one solution to this problem. 
 
B. A Business Judgment Rule for Civil Servants 
 
The business judgment rule is frequently used as a defense in 
corporate law.331 Under a typical formulation of the rule, “[corporate] 
directors will not be held liable for honest mistakes of judgment if they 
acted with due care, in good faith, without a disabling conflict, and in 
furtherance of a rational business purpose.”332 If the courts applied the 
business judgment rule, or a modified version of it, to decisions of 
public employees it would help them to delineate between actions that 
are good for the government and “schemes.” One benefit of this 
solution is that there currently exists a substantial body of law in this 
area in the corporate context. A second, and perhaps more important, 
benefit is that it may prove extremely helpful in cases such as 
Thompson and Bauer where only one person acted, especially since 
the Supreme Court has long held that one person schemes exist.333 
Applying the business judgment rule to the facts of Thompson 
probably leads to the conclusion that she acted within its scope. First, 
she did not have any disabling conflicts.334 Second, the fact that she 
disclosed her “political” considerations to the evaluation committee 
                                                 
329 United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2007). 
330 Id. 
331 E. Norman Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of 
Directors' Business Decisions—An Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy 
and Counselling Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 1247, 1249 (1982). 
332 Id. 
333 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954). 
334 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 879. 
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suggests that she acted with due care and in good faith.335 Third, if we 
accept the court’s hypothesized political motivation of trying to save 
the state money, then that motivation would meet the rational business 
purpose element.336 Finally, in discussing the bribery count, the court 
seems to adopt a quasi business judgment rule with the following 
statement:  
 
Public employees often implement rules with which 
they disagree, and they are tempted to bend these rules 
to achieve what they deem better outcomes. As long as 
the state gets what it contracts for, at the market price, 
no funds have been misapplied, even if the state's rules 
should have led it to buy something more expensive 
(and perhaps of higher quality too). 337 
 
Of course, it is always possible that Thompson did not act in good 
faith and was trying to steer the contract to Adelman in the hopes of 
receiving a bonus for pleasing her boss. But because there currently is 
no business judgment rule as a defense to honest services mail fraud, 
the court did not have access to any evidence on the issue. Ultimately, 
based on the court’s finding that Thompsons was innocent, it is very 
likely that Thompson would have come within the scope of a business 
judgment rule, but this determination cannot be made with certainty. 
Applying the business judgment rule to facts of Bauer leads to the 
conclusion that Bauer’s actions fall outside of its scope. First, he did 
have a disabling conflict in that he was trying to protect his political 
patron from embarrassing information.338 Second, by burying 
investigations into the embarrassing information, Bauer acted with bad 
faith and without regard for the public’s interest in knowing what is 
                                                 
335 See id. 
336 Id. at 879-80. 
337 Id. at 881-82. 
338 See United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at 
*8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2000). 
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occurring in state agencies.339 Thus, his actions would not be protected 
under the business judgment rule. 
In cases where multiple parties are involved, such as Sorich and 
Munson, it is probably less necessary to resort to the business 
judgment rule because it is more likely that there will be extrinsic 
evidence of a scheme. Because others are involved there is more likely 
to be other evidence such as communication records, and there is 
always the possibility of flipping one of the defendants to testify 
against the others. But, if the business judgment rule were applied to 
those cases, Sorich’s and Munson’s actions would be unprotected by 
the rule. Munson engaged in conduct with three Nicor executives to 
manipulate the corporation’s financial information.340 Likewise, Sorich 
took great pains to develop and conceal an elaborate scheme, with at 
least two other individuals, to create a “sham” hiring and promotion 
process.341 Neither action is consistent with concepts of good faith or 
acting in the best interests of one’s employer or the public. 
The above analysis has shown that by adopting a business 
judgment rule for public employees the courts could more readily 
determine whether a public employee’s actions were taken in 
furtherance of the government’s interest, or whether they instead 
amounted to an artful plot or plan meant to deceive—in other words, a 
scheme. Furthermore, this type of analysis has been shown to be 
helpful in the case of a single civil servant’s actions where extrinsic 




The mail fraud statute has long been used in the government’s 
fight against public corruption, and is one of its most powerful 
weapons.342 Through the enactment of § 1346, Congress approved of 
                                                 
339 Id. 
340 United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14274, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004). 
341 United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-25 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
342 See supra note 2. 
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the honest services fraud theory whereby public officials owe 
fiduciary duties to the public.343 But because of the broad language in 
§ 1346, courts have adopted limiting principles to cabin the reach of 
the statute and to counter concerns about vagueness, federalism and 
prosecutorial overreaching.344  
The Seventh Circuit and the Third Circuit have adopted separate 
limiting principles. The Seventh Circuit uses the “misuse of office for 
private gain” standard,345 while the Third Circuit uses the “state law 
fiduciary duty” standard.346 Despite the differences, this Note has 
shown that both standards are likely to lead to the same outcomes 
under the same set of facts. Because of this result, neither standard can 
be found to be better in theory or in practice. At most it appears that 
each circuit will grapple with separate issues. The Third Circuit will 
struggle with determining which state laws create fiduciary duties, and 
the Seventh Circuit will wrangle with determining what constitutes a 
“misuse of office” and a “private gain.” 
In Thompson, the Seventh Circuit determined that raises given in 
the normal course of business and psychic benefits are not private 
gains.347 Previously, however, the Northern District of Illinois had, on 
three separate occasions, held that one’s job or the possibility of a 
future job can serve as a private gain.348 It is possible that the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Thompson simply overrules the Northern District 
cases. But because the Seventh Circuit only found these cases 
unpersuasive and did not explicitly overrule them, it is arguable that 
                                                 
343 United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692 (3d Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir 1998). 
344 See supra note 21. 
345 Bloom, 149 F.3d at 55. 
346 Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93. 
347 United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007). 
348 United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828-30 (N.D. Ill. 2006); 
United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. 2004); United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16784, at *10-12 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
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they are distinguishable and remain good law.349 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Thompson has the potential to create an 
unintended “subtle scheme” problem whereby civil servants can take 
actions that benefit the friends and supporters of their current political-
appointee supervisors without the threat of punishment. This result has 
the potential of hampering the very purpose behind the enactment of § 
1346. 
This Note has argued that this outcome could have been avoided 
had the Seventh Circuit made a threshold determination of whether a 
“scheme,” defined by its ordinary usage, existed. This Note further 
concluded that this determination may not entirely rectify the “subtle 
scheme” problem, especially in the case of a single civil servant. But, 
this Note has shown that this problem can be addressed through the 
adoption of a business judgment rule for public employees. 
                                                 
349 See Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884. 
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